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Abstract
Gesture biometrics are gaining popularity with gesture
input interface on mobile and Virtual Reality (VR) platforms
that lack a keyboard or touchscreen to type a password
for user authentication. However, less attention is paid to
the gesture-based user identification problem, which essen-
tially requires indexing and searching the gesture motion
templates in a large database efficiently. In this paper, we
propose FMHash, a user identification framework that can
generate a compact binary hash code from a piece of in-
air-handwriting of an ID string, which allows fast search in
a database of in-air-handwriting templates through a hash
table. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework,
we implemented a prototype and report preliminary results
(∼98% precision and ∼93% recall). More detailed evalua-
tion, comparison and improvement is working-in-progress.
The ability of hashing in-air-handwriting pattern to binary
code can be used to achieve convenient sign-in and sign-up
with in-air-handwriting gesture ID on future mobile and VR
devices.
1. Introduction
People interact with Virtual Reality (VR) or Augmented
Reality (AR) applications and mobile devices through ges-
ture user interfaces [2, 3]. Such interfaces can capture and
track hand motions in the air, and allow a user to manipulate
menus, dialogues, and other virtual objects directly by hand
gesture. However, for security related tasks such as sign-
up and sign-in, entering the user ID and password through
a virtual keyboard on gesture interfaces become cumber-
some due to the lack of keystroke feedback. Many existing
research [21, 11, 17, 5, 9, 24, 20, 19] exploit the rich in-
formation in native gestures, and esp., in-air-handwriting,
to authenticate a user to access an account. Yet, a usu-
ally neglected function is user identification with gesture or
in-air-handwriting. The former is a true or false question,
i.e., answering whether the user owns the account that he
or she claims to own. The latter is a multiple choice ques-
tion, i.e., answering which account the user wants to login
by a gesture given a database of many accounts. Consider
an analogy of the sign-in procedure over the web on a tra-
ditional computer, the authentication task resembles typing
and checking the password, while the identification task is
searching the database given an ID number or ID string. Is
it possible to construct a system that is capable of (1) taking
a piece of information from a native gesture, or specifically,
an in-air-handwriting of an ID string instead of typing, (2)
search a potentially large database of accounts registered
using the in-air-handwriting of the same ID string, and (3)
return the matched identity or account with high accuracy
and fast respond time?
Compared to gesture based user authentication, the user
identification task is more challenging due to a few unique
characteristics of the gesture. First, gestures have inherent
fuzziness. Even if the same user writes the same string in
the air twice, the generated two signals are not identical but
contains minor variations. Yet, the system should be able
to tolerate the fuzziness and identify the two signals as the
same user, unlike typing an ID string of characters twice
where not a single bit difference is tolerated. Second, it is
difficult for many native gestures to provide enough infor-
mation to enable a large account ID space as well as dis-
tinctiveness. Third, given the fuzziness of the gesture, it is
challenging to design an efficient index of the gesture pat-
terns of all users or accounts to enable fast identification.
In this paper, we propose a framework called FMHash,
i.e., Finger Motion Hash, to efficiently obtain a user’s ac-
count ID from the hand motion of writing an ID string in
the air. FMHash uses a deep convolutional neural network
(called FMHashNet) to convert the in-air-handwriting sig-
nal to a compact binary code, and further enables indexing
and searching the gesture patterns in the account database
with a hash table. This is similar as face recognition, where
a large database of identities are indexed using faces and an
ID can be retrieved by an image of a unknown face. How-
ever, user identification with face has shortcomings. For ex-
ample, one face is linked to one person, and a user can nei-
ther have multiple faces for multiple accounts nor change
or revoke his or her own face. Moreover, if a website re-
quires face image to register, the users will be worried about
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Figure 1. FMHash Framework Architecture.
privacy because it is impossible to stay completely anony-
mous. Yet, with in-air-handwriting of an ID string, the user
can have multiple accounts with different ID strings, change
or revoke the ID string, and stay anonymous by writing
something unrelated to the true identity. In summary, our
contributions in this paper are as follows:
1) We proposed a deep hashing framework of in-air-
handwriting for user identification over gesture interface.
Our method can accommodate gesture fuzziness by hash-
ing multiple instances of the same handwriting by the same
user to the same binary code with high probability of suc-
cess (∼98% precision and∼93% recall in our experiments).
2) We designed a regularizer called the pq-regularizer
and a progressive training procedure for our neural net-
work model to ensures good separation, i.e., hashcode of in-
air-handwriting signals of different accounts are separated
more than two bits in over 99% of the change. Meanwhile,
we can maintain a reasonably fast training speed (∼10 min-
utes for a full training on our dataset).
3) We provided an analysis on the hash code fuzziness
by evaluating our framework with a dataset of 200 account.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Re-
lated works on gesture-based authentication and deep hash-
ing are discussed in section 2. In section 3, the architecture
of the proposed framework is presented. Then we shows the
empirical evaluation results in section 4. Finally we draw
the conclusion and discuss future work in section 5.
2. Related Works
Most 3D hand gesture based authentication systems use
a combination of password and behavioral biometrics, i.e.,
different users differ in either the gesture content or the con-
vention of hand motion, or both. The hand motion is usu-
ally captured by a handheld device [17, 5], wearable de-
vice [21, 20] or a camera [9, 24, 19], and the authentication
service compares the captured motion signal with a tem-
plate [17, 24, 19] or runs a pipeline of feature extractors
and statistical pattern classifiers [5, 20] to make a decision.
The gesture content can be simple movements like shaking
[21] or complex in-air-handwriting of a password or signa-
ture [9, 24, 23]. Most in-air-handwriting password-based
authentication systems [9, 24, 19, 5, 20] only focus on the
difference in the motion signals generated by different users
without understanding the meaning of the writing content.
This feature allows the user to write freely in arbitrary lan-
guage instead of only clearly legible letters, and hence, en-
ables a large password space, which further builds the foun-
dation of our work that asks users to write distinct account
ID strings of arbitrary content. However, identification is
different from authentication. Existing systems need to ex-
haustively check every account in the database using the au-
thentication procedure, which is impractical with large ac-
count database. Instead, we employ deep hashing method to
convert the in-air-handwriting signal to a binary hash code
and identify the user in constant time regardless the number
of accounts.
Deep hashing has been extensively investigated in the
computer vision, pattern recognition, and machine learn-
ing community mainly for image retrieval [25, 14, 26, 27,
28, 8, 16, 15, 7, 10, 18]. Such systems build a deep con-
volutional neural network (CNN) to convert 2D images to
compact binary hash codes, and use the hash code to in-
dex the image database. To search similar images, a query
image is converted to a hash code with the same neural net-
work, and images in the database with the exact same or
neighboring hash code are returned. Existing works mainly
utilize the label of training images through pairwise super-
vision [25, 16], triplet supervision [26, 14], or ranking list
supervision [27], with various regularization and quantiza-
tion loss [16] to train the network to hash images of the
same class to the same code. Although we are also utiliz-
ing CNN to generate hash code, our work has differences.
First, the features of in-air-handwriting motion signal is in-
herently different from the features of image. Second, iden-
tification has different goals from image retrieval. For an
identification system, it is desired to maintain the sparsity
of the Hamming space to avoid wrong identification instead
of maintaining smooth similarity change of the hash code
in image retrieval, and the fuzziness in the signal should not
propagate to the hash code to increase identification accu-
racy. Meanwhile, secret key can be generated from the hash
Figure 2. An example of the motion signal (left) and trajectory in
the 3D space (right) obtained by writing “FMhash” in the air.
code to protect the account information and long hash code
is preferred due to the difficulty to guess. Third, considering
that new accounts are registered from time to time, our net-
work is optimized with smaller number of parameters and
faster training speed.
3. The FMHash Framework
The proposed FMHash framework (shown in Figure 1)
contains five components:
(1) An in-air-handwriting motion capture device (e.g., a
Leap Motion controller [1] in our implementation);
(2) A preprocessing module smoothing and normalizing
the captured motion signal (detailed in section 3.1);
(3) A deep CNN that takes preprocessed motion signal
x as input and generate a high dimensional floating point
latent vector h (denoted as a function f(x) = h, explained
in detail in section 3.2);
(4) An additional neural network layer that project the
latent vector h to low dimensional space and quantize the
projected result to B-bit binary hash code b ∈ {−1,+1}B
(denoted as another function g(h) = b, and B is usually
16, 32, 64, etc., explained in detail in section 3.2);
(5) An account database that stores a hash table index of
account tuples <ID, bID, hID >, where ID is the account
ID (usually a unique number generated by the system at reg-
istration), bID and hID are the hash code and latent vector
corresponding to the account (detailed in section 3.3).
3.1. Signal Acquisition and Preprocessing
The in-air-handwriting of an ID string is captured by the
Leap Motion controller in our implementation as a raw sig-
nal containing the 3D position coordinates of the center of
the palm sampled at about 110 Hz. Once this raw signal
is obtained, we further obtain the 3D velocity, and 3D ac-
celeration by calculating the difference of adjacent position
samples. Then the signal is normalized in pointing direc-
tion (making the average hand pointing direction as x-axis)
and amplitude (mean subtraction and division by standard
deviation). Finally it is resampled to a fixed length of 256
data points in each dimension to form the 256×9 input vec-
tor x. An example of the motion signal and the trajectory of
in-air-handwriting is shown in Figure 2.
layer kernel output #para
input: 256 * 9
conv-pool1 3→1 conv, 2→1 max pool 128 * 48 1.3k
conv-pool2 3→1 conv, 2→1 max pool 64 * 96 14k
conv-pool3 3→1 conv, 2→1 max pool 32 * 128 37k
conv-pool4 3→1 conv, 2→1 avg pool 16 * 192 74k
conv-pool5 3→1 conv, 2→1 avg pool 8 * 256 147k
fc (latent) fully connected 512 1,048k
layer output #para layer output #para
softmax 200 102k projection B 512*B
cross-entropy loss pairwise loss
Table 1. FMHashNet Architecture
3.2. FMHashNet
The deep CNN and the additional projection-
quantization layer are implemented together and col-
lectively called the FMHashNet. There are multiple design
goals we want to achieve with FMHashNet. First, for
a pair of in-air-handwriting signals (x1,x2), if they are
generated by the same user writing the same ID string, the
corresponding hash codes (b1,b2) should be the same in
most cases or differ only in one or two bits sometimes due
to the fuzziness of the signals; if they are generated from
different ID strings (regardless of the same user or different
users), (b1,b2) should differ at least three bits. Second,
the neural network should learn contrastive representations
h to facilitate the projection. Third, it should be easy to
train and fast to converge.
To achieve these goals, we design the FMHashNet in
the following way, as shown in Table 1. First, we apply
5 convolutional and maxpooling layers with simple VGG-
like kernel [22] and a fully connected layer to map input
signal x to latent vectors h. Both the convolutional layer
and the fully connected layer have leaky ReLU activation.
Next, the projection layer project the latent vector h to a
space with the same dimension as the final hash code, i.e.,
z = Wh+ c, where z is the projected vector whose size is
B. After that, the hash code is generated by taking the sign
of the projected vector bi = sign(zi), 1 ≤ i ≤ B. This
is essentially partitioning the latent space by B hyperplanes
to obtain at most 2B regions associated with different hash
code. Additionally, a softmax layer is added in parallel with
the projection layer to help training.
Training the FMHashNet is equivalent to placing all reg-
istered accounts into these 2B regions, which is achieved
progressively in two main steps. First, we train the network
with the softmax layer and cross-entropy loss to make the
filter layers converge. In this step the projection layer is not
activated. Note that the softmax classification layers does
not need to contain all accounts if the account number is
large, or even a independent dataset for pretraining can be
utilized.
Second, we train the network using the projection layer
with the following pairwise loss L, and minibatches of 2M
pairs of signals (x(i)1 ,x
(i)
2 ), 1 ≤ i ≤ 2M . Half of the mini-
batch is pairs of signals from the same class (y(i) = 0), and
half is pairs of signals from different classes (y(i) = 1),
L =
1
2M
2M∑
i=1
L(i),
L(i) = (1−y(i))||z(i)1 −z(i)2 ||+y(i)max(m−||z(i)1 −z(i)2 ||, 0)
+α(P (z
(i)
1 ) + P (z
(i)
2 )) + β(Q(z
(i)
1 ) +Q(z
(i)
2 )).
Here ||.|| is Euclidean norm. In this loss function, the first
term forces the projected vectors of the same classes to the
same value, and the second term forces the projected vectors
of different classes to separate at least m in Euclidean dis-
tance. The remaining terms P (z) andQ(z) are the so-called
pq-regularizer which is specially designed to help place all
registered accounts into different regions and avoid ambigu-
ity in quantization. These two terms are defined as follows:
P (z(i)) =
B∑
j=1
max(|z(i)j | − p, 0),
Q(z(i)) =
B∑
j=1
max(q − |z(i)j |, 0),
where p and q are hyperparameters, |z(i)j | is taking abso-
lute value of the jth component of z(i). This regularizer
forces each element of the projected vector z to reside in
the region [−p,−q] or the region [+q,+p], which corre-
sponds to the bit -1 and bit +1 in the hash code bi after
quantization. With a careful choice of m, we can push a
pair of (z1, z2) of different accounts to opposite regions,
and hence, hash them to different binary codes, as shown in
Figure 3. One example choice of m as in our experiment
is p
√
B, which is the Euclidean distance from the origin
to the point z∗ = (p, p, ..., p). This forces the hash code
of signals of different accounts differ at least one bit. Our
experience shows larger m helps separation, but hurt con-
vergence. The hyperparameter α, β controls the portion of
contribution of the regularizer in the total loss and gradi-
ents. Our design philosophy of the deep hashing network
differs from most related works that try to minimize quan-
tization loss (i.e., forces the projected vector to be close to
the nodes of Hamming hypercube). Instead, we map the in-
put to a bounded Euclidean space and push them away from
the decision boundary zj = 0, where a relatively large re-
gion that can be quantized to the same bit value regardless
of the quantization error. Meanwhile, it reduces the dif-
ficulty of training since the gradient of loss respect to z is
easy to compute compared to the commonly used saturation
method such as tanh or sigmoid relaxation.
Figure 3. The effect of the pq-regularizer that pushes (z1, z2) from
different accounts to different regions, in illustration (left) and with
actual data (right). The right figure is obtained by plotting the first
two dimensions of z of 200 training signals from 200 different
accounts, with p=10 and q=5.
3.3. Account Database and Procedures
As mentioned previously, each account contains a tu-
ple of <ID, b(ID), h(ID) >. At registration time, the
system generates a unique ID number for the registered
account. The user is asked to create an ID string and
write it K times. The obtained K in-air-handwriting signals
{x(1),x(2), ...,x(K)} are utilized to train the FMHashNet.
Once the training is finished, we can use the training signals
to construct bID and hID as follows:
hID =
K∑
i=1
h(i) =
K∑
i=1
f(x(i)),
bID = g(hID) = sign(WhID + c),
where f() is the deep CNN g() is the projection and quan-
tization process, and sign() is element-wise sign function.
A hash table is also constructed to index all account tuples
using the hash codes bID.
At identification time, given a preprocessed in-air-
handwriting signal x′, the following steps are proceeded
to obtain the account ID. First, we run the forward path of
FMHashNet to obtain a latent vector h′ and b′. Second, we
search the hash table using b′ with a fuzziness tolerance of
l bit. If l is 0, we just search the hash table using b′. If l is
not 0, we search the the hash table multiple times with each
element of a collection of hash code S, where S contains all
possible hash codes with a Hamming distance less or equal
than l bits from b′. The rationale is that the fuzziness in the
writing behavior eventually lead to errors that make b′ dif-
fer from the hash code of its real account, but this difference
should be smaller than l bits. In practice, we usually set l
to 1 or 2 to limit the total number of searches for prompt
response. In this way, a collection of candidate accounts
will be obtained. The third step is compare h′ with the la-
tent vector of every candidate account to find the nearest
neighbor. Finally, the account ID of this nearest neighbor is
returned as the identified ID.
4. Experimental Evaluation
4.1. Dataset
We collected our own dataset of 200 accounts with 200
distinct in-air-handwriting ID strings. They are created by
100 users with exactly two accounts per user. For each ac-
count, the user wrote an ID string five times as registration
and then five times as five independent identification tests.
Roughly half of the users are college students (including
both undergraduate and graduate students), and the other
half are people of other various occupations (including both
office workers and non-office workers). The contents of
the ID strings are determined by the users and no two ID
strings are identical. Most users chose a meaningful phrase
for memory easiness and they wrote the ID strings very fast
in an illegible way for convenience. The average time of
writing a ID string in the air is around 3 to 8 seconds, de-
pending on the complexity of the ID string.
4.2. Implementation Detail
We implement the FMHashNet in TensorFlow [4] on a
Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti GPU. The weight parameters are ini-
tialized with the Xavier method [12]and the Adam opti-
mizer [13] with a initial learning rate of 0.001 is used. The
leaky ReLU negative slope is set to 0.2. The regularizer hy-
perparameter p is set to 10, q is set to 5. Based on our expe-
rience, reasonably good results can be achieved with a wide
range of different p and q values as long as p − q is larger
than one. The inter-class distancem is set to p
√
B, the hash
code size B is 16, 32, 48 or 64. For the training protocol,
we first use the softmax layer and cross-entropy loss with
1,000 iterations. Then we use the projection layer and pair-
wise loss with pq-regularizer for another 10,000 iterations.
During these 10,000 iterations, α is set to 0.1, and β is ini-
tially set 0.0001 for the first 4,000 iterations, and gradually
increased 10 times per every 2,000 iterations until 0.1. The
training pairs are selected online, and M is set to 200 in a
minibatch. For the pairs of the same account, we randomly
select an account and two training signals of that account;
for the pairs of different accounts, we calculate the account
hash code bID for each account every 20 iterations, and
select pairs from those accounts whose hash codes differs
less than three bits. If no such account exists, we randomly
choose two signals from two different accounts as a pair.
Another major challenge we encountered is the limited
amount of training data (only five signals per account). To
overcome this challenge, we augment the training dataset
int two steps. First, given K signals {x(1),x(2), ...,x(K)}
obtained at registration, for each x(k) in this set, we align all
the other signals to x(k) to create K − 1 additional signals
using Dynamic Time Warping [6], and in total we can obtain
K2 signals (in our case 25 signals). Second, we randomly
picks two aligned signals and exchanges a random segment
Figure 4. Average Precision
Figure 5. Average Recall
Figure 6. Misidentification Rate
Figure 7. Failure of identification Rate
to create a new signal, and this step is repeated many times.
Finally each account has 125 training signals.
4.3. Empirical Results
We ran experiments with different hash code size B =
16, 32, 48, 64 and fuzziness tolerance l = 0, 1, 2. For a
single experiment, we trained the FMHashNet and ran the
identification procedure with all 200×5 testing signals from
Table 2. Performance Comparison (with hash code side B = 16)
methods
average precision average recall miss-rate fail-rate training
time0 bit 1 bit 2 bit 0 bit 1 bit 2 bit 0 bit 1 bit 2 bit 0 bit 1 bit 2 bit
DSH-like [16] 0.995 0.916 0.636 0.918 0.892 0.632 0.004 0.081 0.362 0.078 0.026 0.005 648 s
tanh 0.970 0.821 0.494 0.443 0.638 0.474 0.014 0.139 0.484 0.544 0.223 0.042 637 s
Ours 0.999 0.995 0.979 0.944 0.972 0.975 0.001 0.005 0.021 0.055 0.023 0.004 610 s
Figure 8. Distribution of the Hamming distance between the ac-
count hash code and the hash code of a testing signal for the same
account (left) and different accounts (right). The left figure is ob-
tained by counting the Hamming distances of all 200×5 pairs of
b(i) and bID , where b(i) and bID are from the same account.
The right figure is obtained by counting the Hamming distances
of all 200×199×5 pairs of b(i) and bID , where b(i) and bID are
from different accounts. The hash code size is 16 bits.
all 200 accounts. Given a signal x in the 5 testing signals
of an account A, if x is correctly identified as account A, it
is a true positive of account A; if it is wrongly identified as
some other account B, it is a false negative of account A and
false positive of account B, also counted as a misidentifica-
tion; if it is not identified as any account, it is a failure of
identification. The performance metrics are average preci-
sion of all accounts (Figure 4), average recall of all accounts
(Figure 5), misidentification rate (total number of misidenti-
fication divided by 200×5, Figure 6), and failure of identifi-
cation rate (total number of failure of identification divided
by 200×5, Figure 7). The results are obtained by averaging
the performance of five repetitions of the same experiment
with the same parameter settings. These results show that
our FMHash framework performs consistently in the user
identification task on our dataset with different hash code
size. In general, longer hash code size provides better secu-
rity since it is more difficult to guess the hash code without
knowing the writing, but it is also more difficult to train due
to the added parameters. Hence, there is slight performance
drop. Also, a larger fuzziness tolerance l leads to less fail-
ure of identification, but more misidentification as well as
improved recall. In practical identification system, we rec-
ommend to set l = 1 for best performance.
Next we evaluate the hash code fuzziness caused by the
inherent fuzziness in the in-air-handwriting. As shown in
Figure 8 (left), only 1.6% of the testing signals are hashed
more than 2 bits away from the hash code of their real ac-
counts. Such fuzziness is mitigated by the separation of the
hash codes of different classes, as shown in Figure 8 (right).
In most cases the hash code of a signal is at least three bits
far away from the hash code of a wrong account.
We further compare our approach with the DSH regu-
larizer [16], which resembles FMHashNet most among all
existing deep hashing methods for image retrieval. The re-
sults are shown in Table 2. For the DSH-like method, the
regularizer scalar is empirically chosen to be 0.1 (best result
achievable), and pair margin m is set to 2B as suggested
in the original paper. Although the DSH-like method can
be seen as an specific case of FMHashNet with α = β
and p = q = 1, the underline design philosophy is com-
pletely different as mentioned in section 3.2. Another com-
mon variant is using saturating activation such as tanh in the
last layer instead of our pq-regularizer, which is also com-
pared in Table 2. In this configuration, pair margin m is
set to 6 (separation of at least 3 bits), and the initial learn-
ing rate is set to 1e-5 to avoid gradient explosion or vanish-
ing. For fair comparison, all compared works have the same
network architecture, the same training method, the same
pair selection strategy, and the same testing protocol. They
only differ in regularizer and loss function. Thus, techni-
cally speaking our DHS-like implementation is not exactly
the original DHS method for hashing images because the
original DHS cannot be directly used without modification.
The major drawback of compared methods is that they are
not optimized to achieve hash space sparsity and fuzziness
tolerance at the same time. As a result, with these scheme, a
considerable amount of hash codes from different accounts
collide or only differ 1 or 2 bits.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a user identification frame-
work named FMHash that can generate a compact binary
hash code and efficiently locate an account in a database
given a piece of in-air-handwriting of an ID string. We
also implement and evaluate the proposed framework with
a dataset of 200 accounts, and the performance is reason-
ably good with 98% precision and 93% recall. The abil-
ity to convert an in-air-handwriting gesture to hash code
gives FMHash great potential for sign-in over gesture in-
put interface. However, it has certain limitations such as
requirement of retraining on the creation of new account
and ID updating. In the future, we will continue improving
the FMHash framework, investigating the long term perfor-
mance, and possible key generation scheme.
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